Stabilization: A New Approach to Whole of Government Operational Planning and Execution

This is a PKSOI paper and has charts, graphs, footnotes, and an Appendix. The introduction is by William Flavin (PKSOI professor) ; Chapter 1 Process, Structure and Culture is by William Flavin in collaboration with, COL Daniel Grassetti, LTC Brian Horton, LTC Joel M. Greer, LTC Kristine Cambre, COL John Dethlefs, and LTC Jeffrey Farris. Chapter 2 New Funding Approached to Stabilization is by Richard Coplen with contributions from COL Kevin Nash and COL Robert Perryman. Chapter 3 Solution or Mirage for "Whole of Government" Collaboration? by Dr. Richard A. Love with contributions from CAPT Daniel Shultz. Published June 2018.

"As the operating environment has changed rapidly since 1947, the response to that environment has also evolved, but not sufficiently fast to achieve successful campaigns in a more efficient and shorter duration engagements. Over the past thirty plus years, numerous academic institutions, think tanks and governmental agencies have identified and catalogued these problems and challenges. From the Eberstadt report to Congress in October 1945 through the Defense Science Board Summer study of 2016, stacks of studies and reports have called for improvements in the national security system, as well as a Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach to national security concerns. These studies call for improvement of the U.S. Government (USG) ability to assess, decide, plan, deliver, and adjust operation and implementation plans, employing a whole of government strategy. However, as the Congressional Research Service in 2012 concluded, there is no consensus among agencies on how to fix the perceived problems. Numerous reforms have occurred, and the need for a holistic approach has been understood, but the basic system remains of stove-piped, non-integrated, horizontal, systemic approaches.

"Since the 1990s, the USG has striven to absorb the strategic lessons from Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, and Syria. These experiences underscored the benefits of applying all of the instruments of national power to complex problems. Still, as numerous reports reveal, gaps persist in several critical areas: civilian capacity; interagency education, training and exercises; effective planning, coordination, and collaboration; cross-organizational understanding of capabilities; an interagency framework that establishes proper roles and responsibilities; unified assessments leading to a shared understanding of the operational environment; adequate statutory authorities and funding mechanisms; and sufficient information sharing."